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To “Advice and ConsentDelay”: The Role of
Interest Groups in the Confirmation of Judges to
the Federal Courts of Appeal
Donald E. Campbell*
ABSTRACT:
Political and partisan battles over nominees to the federal courts of appeal have
reached unprecedented levels. This article considers the reasons for this change in the
process. Using evidence from law and political science, this article proposes that current
confirmation struggles are greatly influenced by increased involvement of interest groups
in the process. The article tests the role of interest groups through an in-depth examination of George W. Bush’s nomination of Leslie H. Southwick to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Utilizing the Southwick case study, the article provides evidence of how interest
groups impact the confirmation process by designating certain nominees as “controversial.” The article proposes that the “controversial” label impacts how senators and the
public view particular nominees and has had a direct and significant impact on the fate
of nominees. Specifically, interest groups shift the incentives of individual senators,
prompting senators to utilize institutional tools of delay in an effort to defeat nominees.
The conclusion is that only structural changes adopted by the Senate as a whole—such as
setting strict time limits on addressing nominations, or eliminating the filibuster for judicial nominees— can resolve the politicalization of the confirmation process.
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INTRODUCTION

In October 2011, Justices Scalia and Breyer appeared before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, at a hearing entitled “Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution
of the United States.” 1 During the course of that hearing, Senator Lindsey Graham (RSC) bemoaned the fact that during his time in the Senate it had become more difficult to
get a nominee through the confirmation process. 2 When Graham asked if either of the
Supreme Court Justices believed that the changing nature of the process had a chilling
impact on the ability to recruit judicial nominees, both Scalia and Breyer replied that they
believed it did. 3 This exchange demonstrates how both the legislative and judicial branches have taken notice of the nature of the current confirmation process. This Article provides an in-depth examination of how the confirmation process currently operates for
those nominees considered “controversial” by examining President George W. Bush’s
nomination of Leslie H. Southwick to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Article’s
larger purpose is to formulate an empirical and theoretical framework for how senators
evaluate nominees, to understand why the system has evolved into the current partisanbased process, and to propose how the system can be modified to move away from a delay-plagued process.
The Article begins in Part II with an examination of changes in the nature of the
confirmation process over time from an essentially deferential patronage-based selection
process to a more ideological and partisan process where interest groups have increasingly become involved and influential. Part III sets out the methodology that will be used to
examine the confirmation of Leslie H. Southwick to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Part IV examines in detail the confirmation experience of Southwick, and also includes a
theoretical explanation of the involvement of interest groups. The article concludes in
Part V with a discussion of how interest group involvement in the confirmation process
has resulted in a change in the incentives of senators, and provides some suggestions for
modifying the process to change these institutional incentives.
II.

THE RISE OF THE CONTESTED JUDICIAL NOMINEE

The U.S. Constitution divides the task of selecting federal judges between the President and the Senate. The President is charged with nominating judicial officers, while the
4
Senate confirms nominees by providing “advice and consent.” This arrangement was a
5
compromise between large and small states in the Constitutional Convention. Beyond
this general division of authority, the Constitution provides no further guidance on what it
means for the Senate to provide the required “advice and consent.” 6
1

Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Senator Lindsey Graham).
2
Id. at 24.
3
Id. at 24-25.
4
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
5
The large states favored a strong executive and argued in favor of Presidential selection of judges
without legislative approval. The small states, seeking as much influence for individual states as possible, sought to have the Senate alone select judges. See Felix A. Nigro, Senate Confirmation, 42 GEO. L.J.
241, 242 (1953).
6
While the Constitution provides no explicit guidance on what it means to provide “advice and consent,” the drafters of the Constitution attempted to create a judiciary in which judicial independence
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The ambiguity of the constitutional division of authority has led to much debate
about the nature of input the Senate should have in the process of seating life-tenured
judges. Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist 76 that the involvement of the Senate
would provide “an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would
tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from
family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.” 7 This quote,
among others from the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the state
ratifying debates, has led some scholars to argue that the Senate’s role should be limited
to evaluating a nominee’s objective qualifications. 8 Others, citing the same language,
have argued that the obligation to provide “advice and consent” authorizes the Senate to
delve deeper than mere qualifications, and justifies inquiry into a nominee’s ideology and
judicial philosophy (i.e., how a nominee will decide particular issues if confirmed). 9 Still
others have argued that the real test should be a nominee’s “moral instincts” as opposed
to judicial philosophy. 10 Such ambiguity and uncertainty has led to shifts in the nature of
the Senate’s involvement in the process over time. 11
Until recently, the debate over the role of the Senate in the confirmation process has
12
focused on confirmation battles of nominees to the United States Supreme Court. The
was a primary concern. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). See also Matthew Madden,
Note, Anticipated Judicial Vacancies and the Power to Nominate, 93 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1139–44 (2007).
7
THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton predicted that the President, knowing the
Senate would be a check on his nominations, would select individuals based on merit (and not other
improper considerations such as favoritism, etc.). Therefore, he states that it is “not very probable
that his nomination would often be overruled.” From the Senate side, Hamilton felt that the Senate
would confirm a proper selection from the President because there was no way for the Senate to be
sure that subsequent nominees would be any more acceptable and they would be hesitant to reject a
nominee and “cast a kind of stigma . . . upon the judgment of the chief magistrate . . .”
8
See Randall R. Rader, The Independence of the Judiciary: A Critical Aspect of the Confirmation Process,
77 KY. L.J. 767, 815 (1988) (“the Senate must elect to exercise its check only in those rare instances in
history where the President has clearly overstepped the bounds of appropriate discretion in the appointment process”). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that “the Senate,
who will merely sanction the choice of the Executive,” would not hesitate to impeach officers the Senate previously confirmed).
9
In this way the Senate provides what Hamilton describes as an “excellent check” on the executive
branch in THE FEDERALIST NO. 76. Richard D. Freer, Advice? Consent? Senatorial Immaturity and the
Judicial Selection Process, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 502 (1988) (arguing that the Founders envisioned a
“bold role” for the Senate in the confirmation process); Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Confirmation
Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE 68,
69 (1991) (“it is my view that senators may reasonably inquire into and base their final decision to
confirm or reject presidential choices on factors other than the nominees' personal and professional
qualifications. Senators may legitimately ask nominees about their political and judicial
ideology . . . . ”). See also Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1202, 1207 (1988) (“a nominee may be rejected on the basis of statesmanship, prudence,
common sense, and politics, rather than constitutional right and duty. Therefore, a nominee may be
rejected without the Senate having to establish humiliating propositions, such as that the nominee is
a dangerous radical”).
10
Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (1988).
11
Marcus E. Hendershot, From Consent to Advice and Consent: Cyclical Constraints Within the District
Court Appointment Process, 63 POL. RES. Q. 328 (2008).
12
Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381 (2010); Jeffrey A. Segal, Albert D. Cover & Charles M. Cameron, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices:
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Supreme Court garners such attention because of its uniquely important status—including
its discretionary docket and focus on salient policy issues, its infrequent vacancies, and its
highly visible nomination and confirmation process. Senators have been particularly interested in exercising their constitutional right of advice and consent when it comes to
Supreme Court vacancies. Since George Washington, the confirmation of justices to the
13
Supreme Court has been viewed as the appropriate venue for partisan and institutional
14
fights over the judicial philosophy of the country’s highest court.
A. Lower Court Nominations as Patronage Positions
Lower federal courts have been viewed differently. Historically these were largely
patronage positions doled out by presidents in consultation with (and at times at the direc15
tion of) senators of the state where the vacancy occurred. As discussed above, because
the Constitution gave no guidance on precisely what it meant to provide “advice” and
how much or what type of scrutiny was contemplated by congressional “consent,” a process arose in which senators shifted the power balance of confirmation struggles to the
legislative branch. 16 Recognizing that a presidential selection without Senate confirmation
dooms the nomination, senators adopted formal and informal rules to protect the rights of
senators (and by extension the Senate) to govern approval of nominees. These tools include senatorial courtesy (recently enforced through the use of the “blue slip”), the hold,
the filibuster, and the ability to schedule hearings both in the Senate Judiciary Committee
and on the floor of the Senate.
The Role of Ideology in Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 77 KY. L.J. 485, 487 n.9 (1988)
(collecting sources).
13
See JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 26–31 (1995). George Washington's nomination of John Rutledge as Chief Justice failed due to partisan opposition to his speaking
out against the Jay Treaty. See also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES & PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1985).
14
Jeffrey Segal, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institutional Politics, 49 J.
POL. 998 (1987).
15
Joseph Harris, The Courtesy of the Senate, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 36, 37–38 (1952) (“[T]he custom of permitting the senators of the party in office to select the persons for federal appointment in their own
states results in political and often in patronage appointments. The actual selections are frequently
made by party leaders rather than by senators, and these federal offices are commonly used to reward party workers or the supporters of the senators. In the past, unqualified persons have often
received the necessary political sponsorship and have been appointed.”). See also Roger E. Hartley &
Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 277
(1996) (“[P]rior to Carter lower court nominations and confirmations were more routine. Norms of
senatorial courtesy in recruitment and confirmations were quite strong and there is some evidence
that the Justice Department deferred many lower court nomination decisions to senators.”).
16
There is some irony in this occurrence. In Federalist No. 76, Hamilton states that one justification
for placing the appointment power in the hands of the President was to avoid the type of log-rolling
that would inevitably occur in the legislative branch. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton). In
commenting on why it was a bad idea for the Senate to appoint judges (and other officers), Hamilton
notes that “the coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent: ‘Give us the man we
wish for this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that.’ . . . And it will rarely happen that the
advancement of the public service will be the primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations.” Id. The norm of senatorial courtesy that developed in the Senate, which shifted the balance of power in the judicial nomination process to the Senate, proved Hamilton to be prescient.
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Historically, the tool providing individual senators the most power is senatorial
courtesy, a process in which a senator will defer to the opinions of home-state senators
with regard to judicial vacancies in the senator’s state, with the expectation that such deference will be reciprocated when vacancies arise in the supporting senator’s state:
It is, of course, exceedingly helpful to a senator to be able to reward supporters with good posts in the federal government. Conversely, it is enormously damaging to a senator’s prestige if a president of his own party ignores him when it comes to making an appointment from or to the senator’s own state. What is even more damaging to a senator’s prestige and
political power is for the president to appoint to a high federal office
someone who is known back home as a political opponent of the senator.
It was easy for senators to see that if they joined together against the president to protect their individual interests in appointments, they could to a
large degree assure that the president could only make such appointments
as would be palatable to them as individuals. Out of such considerations
17
grew the custom of “senatorial courtesy.”
Historically, if a senator objected to a President’s nomination to a judicial opening in a
senator’s state, 18 the senator merely needed to state that the nominee was “personally ob19
noxious” to invoke senatorial courtesy and defeat the nomination. Since the early twentieth century, the norm of senatorial courtesy has been enforced through the blue slip process. 20 The blue slip procedure operates at the level of the Judiciary Committee:
When a judicial nomination is made, the Chair of the Judiciary Committee
sends “blue slips” (so called because of the color of the paper used) to the
senators of the nominee’s home state. If even one senator declines to return the slip, then the nomination is dead in the water, or further action
will be extremely difficult, depending on the practice the Committee Chair
21
decides to follow.
While blue slip deference is an informal mechanism that the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee can choose not to follow, there are strong individual and institutional pres-

17

HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 (1972).
Or a seat on a court of appeal traditionally associated with a particular state.
19
JOSEPH HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 215–37 (1953). See also Harris, supra note 15,
at 39 (“An objection to a nominee does not mean that the nominee is actually 'personally obnoxious'
to the objecting senator; it frequently involves no animus whatever, but merely indicates that the senator has another candidate.”).
20
Sarah A. Binder, Where Do Institutions Come From? Exploring the Origins of the Senate Blue Slip, 21
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1 (2007) (Blue Slip process became institutionalized in approximately 1913 as a
way to determine the home-state Senator's position on a nominee to eliminate uncertainty about the
opposition a nominee will receive early in the process).
21
Brannon P. Denning, The Judicial Confirmation Process and the Blue Slip, 85 JUDICATURE 218, 220
(2002).
18
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22

sures to adhere to the process. For example, when Orrin Hatch (R-UT) became Chair of
the Judiciary Committee in 2001, he threatened to move forward with the judicial nominees of President George W. Bush despite the opposition of home-state Democratic senators. This caused an uproar among the Democrats—and resulted in threats to block all of
Bush’s nominees. 23 The likely showdown was averted when Vermont Senator Jim Jeffords left the Republican Party to become an Independent (caucusing with the Democrats), shifting control of the Senate to the Democrats. 24 In 2003, with Republicans reclaiming control of the Senate, Hatch followed through with his threat to reject blue slip
deference—resulting in Democratic filibusters of Bush nominees. 25
In addition to the tool of senatorial courtesy, while a nomination is pending before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, members of the Committee can request a delay of the
vote on a nominee, which is traditionally honored. While this request for delay will typically not kill a nomination, it does give additional time for opponents (or supporters) of
the nominee to seek additional votes, and indicates that the nominee may face opposition.
Once a nominee makes it to the floor of the Senate, any senator may engage in a filibuster
of the nominee. To end the filibuster, sixty senators must vote to invoke cloture and end
debate. Mustering sixty votes for a filibustered nominee can be a difficult task. Finally,
any senator can place a “hold” on a nominee. The hold has historically been a method
which allowed additional time for senators to “conduct research, prepare for debate, or
26
accommodate busy schedules.” Today, however, placing a hold can indicate intent of a
27
senator to filibuster, and can essentially kill the nomination.
There are two additional institutional tools available to the majority party in the
Senate. The first is at the level of the Judiciary Committee. The Chairman of the Committee has the power to determine which nominations receive hearings and ultimately a vote.
Of course, a nominee who receives no vote in the Judiciary Committee does not have an
opportunity to reach the floor of the Senate. In addition, the majority leader of the Senate
determines if and when a nomination—once out of the Judiciary Committee—will receive a vote on the floor of the Senate. These scheduling powers provide two additional
points of delay or defeat for a nomination.
It is understandable that because of the institutional constraints faced by Presidents
in getting their nominee confirmed they have an incentive to consult with senators when
22

AMY STEIGERWALT, BATTLE OVER THE BENCH: SENATORS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND LOWER COURT CONFIRMATIONS
56 (2010) (“[T]he predominant reason for the invocation of senatorial courtesy is institutional. Institutional senatorial courtesy reflects the ongoing struggle between the legislative branch and the executive branch over the power to select judges and over what the Senate’s constitutional advice and
consent role truly encompasses. Institutional senatorial courtesy arises when senators believe they
have not been adequately consulted about nominations to vacancies in their state, and so senators
call on their colleagues to support their institutional claim to the power to select judicial nominees.”).
23
Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats Press Bush for Input on Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2001.
24
John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Appointments Process Under Bill
Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 21–22 (2003).
25
Id. at 25–26.
26
LAUREN COHEN BELL, WARRING FACTIONS: INTEREST GROUPS, MONEY, AND THE NEW POLITICS OF SENATE
CONFIRMATION 45 (2002).
27
Id. (“Beginning in the late 1960s, the number of requests for holds began to increase, and today
senators use requests to hold legislation hostage, seek revenge, or embarrass political enemies.”).
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deciding whom to nominate to ensure that the nominee goes through the confirmation
process as smoothly as possible. 28 Therefore, for most of the nation’s history, the nomination and confirmation of lower federal court judges has been a negotiation process between the President and home-state senators—with both knowing where the other stood
on a nominee—with little outside influence in the process.
B. The Rise of Interest Group Involvement in the Confirmation Process
In recent times, however, the confirmation process has changed. Presidents have
started to see the appointment of lower federal court judges as an opportunity to establish
29
an ideological legacy. Because the Supreme Court decides very few cases, the lower
federal courts (and particularly the courts of appeal) have become the courts of last resort
for almost all litigants. President Reagan, while not the first President to consider ideology as the primary factor in these lower court judicial appointments, established the trend
30
that all subsequent presidents have followed.
Why the shift from selection based on negotiation and patronage to ideology?
Scherer argues that the change has occurred for two primary reasons. 31 First, there has
been a shift in the nature of party politics. Under the old party system (through the mid
1960s), the party structure was a loose association of local party activists. These activists
were particularly interested in the spoils that successful elections brought, and were not
ideological purists who demanded the same from lower court nominees. 32 In addition,
28

President Johnson supposedly said when dealing with nominees, that the Senate was divided into
“whales” and “minnows” and the key was to negotiate with the few whales, and the President could
expect the minnows to fall into line. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME
COURT CONFIRMATIONS 19 (1994). See also Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme
Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069 (1999)
(setting out a spatial model indicating how Presidents consider the ideology of the Senate in proposing Supreme Court nominees).
29
Hartley et al., supra note 15.
30
Prior presidents certainly appreciated the importance of ideology—including Franklin Roosevelt,
Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon—but the emphasis on ideology became a lasting and systematic
consideration of judicial selection at all levels after the defeat of President Reagan Supreme Court
nominee Robert Bork in 1987. Judge Rader notes three unique aspects of the Bork confirmation process: “[F]irst, the abandonment of most self-imposed restraints on the nature and purpose of the inquiries; second, the expansion in terms of length and repetitiveness of the inquiry process; and third,
an element out of the control of the Senate but influenced by the nature of the Senate proceedings, the
use of direct political grassroots campaigning and mass media advertising to shape public opinion on
the nomination and affect the outcome.” Rader, supra note 8, at 807 (emphasis added). For a discussion of how presidents from Franklin Roosevelt through Ronald Reagan selected judicial nominees,
see generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGH REAGAN (1997).
31
It should be noted that an institutional condition leading to an increase in interest group involvement was passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. This Amendment resulted in senators’
constituencies moving from state legislators to the state citizens. Such a change laid the foundation
for the interest group involvement that would arise later. See Melone, supra note 9, at 73 (“[The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment] may have made senators more sensitive to interest group and
grassroots awareness of judicial policymaking”).
32
NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT
PROCESS 11–12 (2005).
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because the parties themselves were heterogeneous (e.g., the divide between Northern
and Southern Democrats), an ideological test for nominees was impossible. 33 This began
to change in the 1960s as the parties became more homogenous and unwilling to compromise on issues of ideology. 34
In addition to a change in parties, there was also a shift in the types of cases that
federal courts addressed. Whereas prior to the 1950s, the federal courts addressed primarily property and business claims, beginning in the 1950s the Court broadened the types of
cases on its agenda, including social issues related to the right to privacy and civil rights
and liberties. 35 With the combination of homogenous political parties and a changing federal court docket, activists insisted that lower federal court nominees—who would be
interpreting and implementing the new rights adopted by the Supreme Court—be ideologically compatible. 36
This shift in the nature of judicial selection and confirmation changed the complexion of the process. It meant that nominees who in the past would have been selected on
patronage-based qualifications were instead vetted and selected based on their ideological
purity, and senators began to oppose certain nominees to “score points” with interest
groups and political activists whose interests had prompted them to become involved in
37
the confirmation process. Changes in the party structure and the Supreme Court’s docket
coincided with technological changes that modified senatorial incentives. Beginning in
the late 1950s, the increasing prevalence of television coverage began to provide junior
senators opportunity (and incentive) to go against the norms of deference in the Senate to
pursue their own ideological goals. 38 In addition, the rise of interest group involvement
prompted individual senators to look outside the Senate body for direction in addressing
39
confirmations.
This partisan-based shift in the confirmation process placed a strain on the institution-protecting norms within the Senate. While opposition senators were willing to defer
to patronage-based nominees, they became increasingly unwilling to defer to ideological33

Id. at 12.
Id. See also NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: STRATEGIES OF AMERICAN
ELECTORAL POLITICS 30–31 (1976) (“Purists consider the stock-in-trade of the politician—compromise
and bargaining, conciliating the opposition, bending a little to capture support—to be hypocritical;
they prefer a style that relies on the announcement of principles and on moral codes.”).
35
See generally CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1998). See also Thomas P. Lewis, Commentary
on Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 77 KY. L. J. 539, 544 (1988) (“If it is perceived that
the Court simply reaches results on the basis of what the justices believe is fair—on issues that touch
so many of us—without any other basic restraints, it is obvious that constituencies will develop
around certain types of nominees and marshal their forces to sway the Senate. The Senate will have
less and less choice about the wisdom of thoroughly politicizing the confirmation process.”).
36
SCHERER, supra note 32, at 13–21. See also J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 10 (1981) (“Lower
federal courts, their discretion stretched to implement broad decrees, resemble administrative agencies. They oversee great public enterprises in education, housing, and economic development. They
also serve as ombudsmen for relief of official abuse. And in the process of enlarging their sphere of
influence federal judges have enlarged their political risks.”).
37
SCHERER, supra note 32, at 23. Scherer calls the strategies used to score points with these political
activists “elite mobilization strategies.”
38
BELL, supra note 26, at 43.
39
BELL, supra note 26, at 44.
34
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ly based nominees. 40 The question is how to observe and measure this changing process
with regard to courts of appeal nominees.
C. Understanding the Change in the Confirmation Process for Court of Appeals Nominees
It is clear that the lower court confirmation process is different from what occurs at
the Supreme Court level. While Supreme Court nominees almost always receive a floor
vote and can expect to receive varying amounts of opposition, lower court nominees are
less likely to make it to the Senate floor for a vote. But those who do make it are over41
whelmingly confirmed, often by a voice vote or without any significant opposition. For
example, between 1985 and 2004, of the 284 nominations to the federal courts of appeal,
192 received floor votes, none of the nominees who made it to the Senate floor were de42
feated, and 170 were confirmed unanimously or with only one “no” vote. Figure 1 sets
out the percentage of confirmed lower federal court judges for Presidents Truman through
George W. Bush, and demonstrates two points. First, the percentage of judicial nominees
(both district court and court of appeals nominees) who are ultimately confirmed is very
high. Second, although the percentage confirmed remains high, the Table indicates that
the trend line begins decreasing during the presidency of George H.W. Bush.
Figure 1.

The overwhelming percentage of successful nominees may create the perception of a lack
of opposition, but this is incongruent with the changing nature of the process, where the
43
political battles over some nominations reach a fevered pitch. This discrepancy has led
40

STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 7–8 (“These changes in how presidents approached the selection of
lower court nominees subsequently led to a transformation in how the Senate processed these nominations. Senators grew dismayed at the reduction in their power to select nominees, as well as concerned by the increasing political and ideological tenor of the resulting appointments, and they began
to screen nominations to the federal bench more carefully.”).
41
Garland W. Allison, Delay in Senate Confirmation of Federal Judicial Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 8, at 9
(1996).
42
Nancy Scherer, Brandon Bartels & Amy Steigerwalt, Sounding the Fire Alarm: The Role of Interest
Groups in the Lower Court Confirmation Process, 70 J. POL. 1026, 1027 (2008).
43
Allison, supra note 41, at *8; Hartley et al., supra note 15, at 277.

9

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

scholars to go behind the scenes to discover how opposition impacts lower court nominees. They discovered that the fight over lower court judges most often occurs not in the
floor vote—but in pre-floor procedures. Utilizing procedural tools available to them such
as senatorial courtesy, holds, and scheduling decisions, senators were delaying considera44
tion of nominees they opposed.
Delay can occur between the time of the vacancy and a presidential nomination. 45 It
46
can also occur between the time of the nomination and confirmation. To demonstrate the
impact that delay has had on the process, the average number of days for a court of appeals nominee to be confirmed rose from 33.3 days for President Carter’s nominees to
305.4 days during the first two years of George W. Bush’s first term. 47 This evidence of
delay fits into the declining Senate norms discussed above. As senators began to seek
increased media exposure and to satisfy special interests, the traditional patronage-based
approach—which relied on the norms associated with an ingrained system of seniority in
the Senate—began to fail. Taking its place was a politically charged system of delay. 48
Delay is particularly effective at providing an opportunity for attention and extended opposition: “[d]rawing the proceedings out over time permits the opposition to organize,
new information to be discovered, the public to be aroused.” 49
Evidence demonstrating a shift to a longer and more contentious confirmation
process for some nominees, while important itself, only presents half the story. After all,
not every lower court nominee faces opposition and long delay. To complete the story, it
is necessary to delve into the nature of the senatorial opposition. There are a number of
reasons that a senator may delay a nominee. Often opposition has nothing to do with the
nominee. Instead, a senator may delay a nominee in retaliation for how other nominees
50
were treated, or to gain leverage in a dispute unrelated to the nominee. Opposition based
on these factors, while important, is beyond the scope of this article.
This article is particularly interested in those nominees opposed on the basis of the
nominee’s ideology. This type of opposition—especially by non-home-state senators—is
interesting to study because it seems to be illogical when considered in a Mayhewian
44

Lauren Cohen Bell, Senatorial Discourtesy: The Senate's Use of Delay to Shape the Federal Judiciary,
55 POL. RES. Q. 589 (2002); Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, The Limits of Senatorial Courtesy, 29
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (2004); Wendy L. Martinek, Mark Kemper & Steven R. Van Winkle, To Advise and Consent: The Senate and Lower Federal Court Nominations, 1977-1998, 64 J. POL. 337 (2002) (delay in
confirmation is exacerbated by divided government, nomination in the last year of a president's term,
and nominations that occur after the Bork nomination).
45
Tajuana D. Massie, Thomas G. Hansford & Donald R. Songer, The Timing of Presidential Nominations
to the Lower Federal Courts, 57 POL. RES. Q. 145 (2004) (finding that presidents delay putting forth
judicial nominees to the district courts and courts of appeal when institutional constraints such as
control of the Senate make it unlikely the President will be successful in nominating someone that
shares the President’s policy preferences).
46
Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998, 46
AM. J. POL. SCI. 190 (2002); David C. Nixon & David L. Goss, Confirmation Delay for Vacancies on the
Circuit Court of Appeals, 29 AM. POL. RES. 246 (2001).
47
Sheldon Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002: Some Thoughts on the Politics of Lower Federal
Court Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 695, 709, 711 (2003).
48
BELL, supra note 26, at 45.
49
SILVERSTEIN, supra note 28, at 23.
50
STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 49–94.
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sense: Why would a senator expend resources to oppose a judicial nominee who does not
decide cases from the senator’s state, and who will not decide cases that involve the sena51
tor’s constituents? For a senator who is primarily interested in reelection, using scarce
resources and political capital to oppose a judicial nominee whose job will not impact the
senator’s constituents runs counter to the traditional understanding of congressional motivations. 52
To understand this puzzle, it is useful to consider the decision-making process of a
nominee through the lens of the consensus mode of policy decision-making developed by
Kingdon. 53 First, when no controversy arises, a senator’s inclination is to “vote with the
herd” and approve the nominee. 54 This go-along-to-get-along attitude is necessary because of the numerous obligations on senators’ time and resources. The lack of opposition
indicates to the senator that he or she will face no consequences for an affirmative vote. 55
The response changes, however, when a controversy is triggered in a senator’s “field of
forces,” including the senator’s personal attitude about the issue/nominee under consideration and the position of constituents, interest groups, or fellow trusted senators. 56 When a
policy becomes controversial, the senator will evaluate how many and which forces in his
or her field conflict and, based upon the number and weight of the opposing fields, decide
57
how to proceed.
The study by Scherer and colleagues’ study of controversial court of appeals nominees fits nicely into the Kingdon model. 58 They identify the increase in the involvement
of interest groups in the process as a justification for a senator opposing a nominee. To
put this in the terms of the Kingdon model, interest group involvement causes senators to
move from the herd and justifies expressing opposition to a nominee. 59 In interviews with
leaders of several interest groups, Scherer and her colleagues found that during the presidency of George W. Bush, liberal interest groups actively researched every nominee to
both the federal district court and courts of appeals. When these groups uncovered something they considered problematic (i.e., information indicating that the nominee might
vote against the group’s policy positions), they would share the information, “first with
sympathetic senators on the Judiciary Committee, and later, with sympathetic senators
51

DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (1974). Mayhew famously hypothesized
that members of Congress are “single minded seekers of reelection,” and that their actions are taken
to further this goal. Id. Mayhew proposes three primary activities that members of congress engage in
to obtain this goal: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. Id. at 73.
52
Id.
53
JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING DECISIONS 229–41(1973).
54
Id. at 230.
55
Id. (“On final passage of numerous bills, and on some amendments, the congressman simply sees
no conflict in his environment at all; he often does not even bother to look further into the matter . . .
given the terrific press for time and the competition among various matters for his attention, there is
little point to studying matters over which there is no controversy.”).
56
Id. at 232.
57
Id. at 234–35.
58
See Segal et al., supra note 12, at 491 (discussing the consensus model in the context of Supreme
Court nominees).
59
The interest groups in this scenario play the role of “opposition entrepreneurs” seeking to prompt
Senators to “see controversy and to scrutinize nominees closely.” Glen S. Krutz, Richard Fleisher & Jon
R. Bond, From Abe Fortas to Zöe Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate, 92 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 871, 878 (1998).
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60

throughout the chamber . . . .” Interest groups may also go public with their opposition,
writing op-ed pieces and encouraging their members to actively oppose a nominee.
Interest groups thus prompt senators to abandon the presumption-of-confirmation
that occurs when they adhere to the norm of senatorial courtesy, and move senators into a
defensive mode, more willing to examine (and challenge) a particular nominee. The interest group’s action has been described as sounding a “fire alarm” that senators heed,
“because interest groups represent the views of key constituents in the two major parties—constituents who not only care about the make-up of the lower federal courts but
who also are the most mobilized voters—senators are reluctant to ignore the views ex61
pressed by interest groups.” Add to this the fact that interest groups impact fundraising,
and the question of why senators choose to become involved in lower court confirmation
battles becomes clearer. 62
Interest group opposition can have substantive implications for a judicial nominee.
When interest groups do not raise the alarm, senators will routinely and relatively quickly
confirm a nominee. On the other hand, when an alarm is sounded, the nominee’s chances
of confirmation go down significantly: “ . . . unopposed nominations experience a 0.85
probability of confirmation, nominees opposed by conservative groups a 0.78 probability
of confirmation (a change of 0.07) and nominees opposed by liberal groups a 0.52 proba63
bility of confirmation (a change of 0.33).” In short, the presence of interest group opposition can trigger a sympathetic senator to view the nominee as controversial and worth
opposing to score points with interest groups and party activists who could impact the
senator’s reelection. Once a senator perceives the nominee as controversial, the senator is
willing to utilize institutional tools of opposition, delay, or both, resulting in a delay in
confirmation or a reduced likelihood of the nominee’s being confirmed.
D. The Nature of Interest Group Opposition: Agenda Setting and Framing
The fact that interest group involvement has changed the nature of confirmations
raises additional questions. For example, how do interest groups become involved and
what impact do they have on the process? During the presidencies of Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush, there were 167 individuals nominated to the courts of appeals; only fifty-five (thirty-three percent) were considered “controversial” and actively opposed by
64
65
interest groups. Furthermore, of those fifty-five, only twenty-five were not confirmed.
60

Scherer et al., supra note 42, at 1028.
Id. at 1029. See also Segal et al., supra note 12, at 506 (1988) (presenting empirical evidence that
ideologically distant senators will play a significant role in the senator's vote on a Supreme Court
nominee only when there is a factor in addition to ideology to trigger opposition such as the fact that
“the nominee is of less than sterling quality or the political environment is hostile to the president”).
62
BELL, supra note 26, at 52 (interest group incentives “are both electoral and financial; with their
ability to educate and mobilize the grass roots, interest groups make senators’ constituents aware of
impending confirmation decisions. PACs frequently use their campaign-financing role to provide incentives to senators who act on the confirmation in the way desired”). See also Scherer, supra note 32,
at 25–26 (2005) (discussing actions that National Organization for Women (NOW) would be willing
to take, including contacting donors, to make sure that their opposition to a judicial candidate was
made clear).
63
Scherer et al., supra note 42, at 1035.
64
To identify those nominees who are considered “controversial,” the article uses the convention
developed by Scherer et al. A nominee is considered controversial if she is publicly opposed by at
61
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The seemingly low number of judicial nominees opposed by interest groups is a strategic
decision. While a group who opposes the policies of the appointing President may believe
that all nominees are objectionable, it is not feasible to oppose all nominees for two main
reasons. First, groups simply do not have the resources to oppose all nominees (another
difference from Supreme Court nominees). Second, senators are only willing to actively
oppose a limited number of nominees. 66 This makes the limited number of nominees that
interest groups identify as “controversial” a particularly interesting group to analyze.
Those who study the issue of interest group opposition find the groups have varying approaches to determining which nominee to oppose. Some groups have the resources
to investigate each nominee. Other groups rely on grassroots members to bring potential
issues to the leaders at the national level. 67 Once a group has chosen a nominee to oppose,
it must be able to move the issue onto the agenda of senators and the public. Agenda setting—a concept taken from political communication literature—is “the process by which
68
problems become salient as political issues meriting the attention of the polity.” In
short, interest groups must make senators believe that a particular nominee is worth parting from the herd and opposing.
Interest groups engage in three activities in hopes of moving a particular nominee
onto the agenda. First, they distribute information to a senator’s constituents who are
sympathetic to the interest group’s position in an attempt to harden opposition to a nominee. 69 Second, groups coordinate with sympathetic citizens to build grassroots opposition
least two national interest groups. Active opposition includes op-ed pieces in newspapers as well as
press releases and statements opposing a nominee. See Scherer et al., supra note 42, at 1032 and Web
Appendix D; STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 199–201.
65
These calculations were based on individual nominees and not nominations. When the Senate fails
to act on a nomination before the end of the Congress, the nomination lapses and is returned to the
president pursuant to Senate Rule XXXI. S. COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE
SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-9, at 16–17 (2007) (Rule XXXI), available at
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXXI. The president must then re-nominate
the individual (or nominate someone else). These subsequent re-nominations are not considered in
this calculation.
66
SCHERER, supra note 32, at 131 (“[L]iberal activists firmly believe that Democratic senators on the
Judiciary Committee will only vote against so many judicial nominees in deference to the president.
How many ‘no’ votes each senator has is a huge question mark for these groups. Accordingly, for liberals, yesterday’s confirmation fight directly affects tomorrow’s confirmation fight.”).
67
SCHERER, supra note 32, at 123–26. Scherer notes that the method of investigation varies among
Democratic and Republican–leaning groups, with liberal groups performing assessments of each
nominee and conservative groups relying on grassroots information. In addition, Scherer notes a difference of defining what constitutes a “controversial” nominee based on the characteristics of the
group. For example, some groups such as the conservative Judicial Selection Monitoring Project or the
liberal Alliance for Justice evaluate nominees on the basis of the nominee’s “judicial philosophy.” Other, more issue-specific groups, such as National Abortion Rights and Reproductive Action League or
Concerned Women for America, evaluate nominees based solely on their position on a single issue
(i.e., abortion).
68
Fay Lomax Cook, Tom R. Tyler, Edward G. Goetz, Margaret T. Gordon, David Protess, Donna R. Leff &
Harvey L. Molotch, Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers, and Policy, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 1, 16–35 (1983).
69
Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499, 503 (1998).
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(or at least the appearance of grassroots opposition) to a nominee through, for example, email, letter-writing campaigns, or op-ed pieces. 70 Third, groups can provide information
directly to a senator about the nominee. 71Although there is not a consensus, some groups
have noted that direct communication with senators may not be the most effective method
72
because the institutional pressure to defer to selected nominees is great. Instead, to move
a nominee onto the radar of a senator, they must have active grassroots support:
[T]o have any real impact in influencing the appointment process, it is not
enough for elites ‘inside the Beltway’ to voice objections to the nominees
– by posting information on their websites, publishing op-ed pieces in
leading conservative or liberal media outlets, or lobbying politicians directly. Rather, as everyone interviewed readily conceded, it is absolutely
critical that they also get grass-roots activists involved in the process – by
writing letters, sending e-mails, telephoning their elected representatives,
and in some extreme cases, organizing rallies against specific lower court
nominees. These grass-roots activities are critical because they send messages to senators that thousands of the most mobilized constituents in their
party object to a particular nominee, and that their critical support of that
politician in the next election may turn on a senator’s public stance on that
73
nominee.
Mobilizing grassroots opposition to a nominee, while necessary, is not sufficient to
achieve a group’s goal of defeating a nominee. Interest groups also must influence how
senators think, and get enough senators to adopt their position to defeat the nomination.
This influence occurs through framing. Framing is the act of “selecting and highlighting
some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a
74
particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.” From a theoretical perspective, it
is useful to think of the framing process utilizing the cascading activation model devel75
oped by Entman.
The choice of how to frame a nominee is important. Ineffective depictions of nominees will be ignored and result in a waste of time, resources, and possibly goodwill with
sympathetic senators. In addition, poorly chosen frames can isolate senators who might

70

Id. at 503–04.
Id. at 504.
72
As a prominent conservative activist put it: “We [JSMP] don’t do a lot of direct lobbying from us to
the senators [in order to get them to vote against a particular nominee]. It wouldn’t be effective . . . I
long ago disabused myself of the notion that because Republican senators articulate the right principles that there would be spontaneous combustion. That they’d do what they said they would do. It
just doesn’t work. It’s too much of an insider game to just work [at defeating a nominee from] . . . inside the Beltway.” SCHERER, supra note 32, at 127.
73
Id. at 126–27 (citations omitted).
74
ROBERT M. ENTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF POWER 5 (2004).
75
Id.
71
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otherwise support the group’s position 76 Entman proposes that the most effective frames
will be those which have high cultural resonance and magnitude and which cognitively
77
trigger a preferred “schema.” When a schema is triggered, the feeling or ideas in the
“knowledge network” associated with the schema come to the mind of the recipient. Depictions that are most effective are those which are culturally resonant—understandable,
memorable, and emotionally charged. Magnitude, the prominence and repetition of particular words or phrases, also increases the power of the chosen depiction. The greater the
resonance and magnitude, the more likely the frame is to evoke similar emotional associ78
ations, thoughts, and feelings. Take, for example, a nominee appointed by a Republican
President. If an interest group can convincingly frame the nominee as anti-civil rights or
homophobic—culturally congruent frames—they may be able to trigger opposition from
sympathetic senators. A Democratic nominee could be depicted as soft on crime or in
favor of broad abortion rights. The magnitude of the frame can be increased through the
media or through a mobilized grassroots campaign (e.g., through fax or e-mail). On the
other hand, a weak frame that does not have a strong cultural resonance may result in no
or very little opposition. For example, one might expect opposition based on technical or
procedural legal issues not to be a sufficiently strong depiction to trigger senatorial opposition.
The process of bringing a particular schema and knowledge network into play is
79
described as cascading or spreading activation. The goal of interest groups is to trigger
particular thoughts and feelings to “activate” the group’s base and subsequently to motivate senators to oppose a nominee. This is called a “cascading” activation model because
the spread of frames “cascades” down from interest groups to the media, the public, and
senators. Because initial depictions are difficult to dislodge, the initial choice of how to
frame a nominee and the frames that are (or are not) successful are important aspects of
the confirmation process.
Interest groups have a particular advantage in pressing depictions because in this
area senators are “satisficers”—willing to make decisions based on less than complete or
80
optimal information. There are two primary reasons for this. First, for all nominees, senators simply do not have the resources or the desire to do an independent investigation
into the nominee’s background. Second, for nominees who have previously served as
judges, the background material is voluminous and nearly impossible for a senator or her
staff to read and interpret. 81 Therefore, senators rely on (and are susceptible to) frames
76

SCHERER, supra note 32, at 128. Scherer gives the example of a controversial nominee who is framed
solely on her position on abortion. Such a frame may operate to lose the votes of pro-choice Republican Senators, whereas a broader philosophical frame may have been more effective.
77
ENTMAN, supra note 74, at 7. Schema are “clusters or nodes of connected ideas and feelings stored in
memory.”
78
Id. at 6.
79
Id. at 7.
80
See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV.
129, 129 (1956) (“organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; they do not in general ‘optimize’”).
81
STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 105. Quoting a Senate staffer: “It’s knowing that the groups are doing
[research] that we are able to focus our energies on other things. If they didn’t, we probably would
make an effort, but we have to focus on other things the Committee does . . . .”
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82

proposed by interest groups. Senate staffers have described the information provided by
83
interest groups as “easy” and “invaluable.” This is particularly true for senators who are
84
not members of the Judiciary Committee. To put this in terms of the cascading activation model, “what passes between levels of the cascade is not comprehensive understanding but highlights packaged into selective, framed communications. As we go down the
levels, the flow of information becomes less and less thorough, and increasingly limited
to the selected highlights, processed through schemas, and then passed on in ever-cruder
85
form.” Therefore, interest groups must present their chosen frame in such a concise and
understandable manner (without excessive nuance or complexity) that senators can utilize
the information to form an opinion on the nominee.
In sum, the turn in the confirmation process from patronage-based to ideologybased consideration has transformed the nature of the process. It has led to an increasingly important role for those groups most interested in the ideological makeup of the federal
courts. The groups select certain nominees to oppose and then attempt to move them onto
the agenda of senators. The move onto the agenda is not automatic. Groups must use culturally congruent frames and must use them often. Through the use of select depictions,
interest groups hope senators will deviate from their tendency to vote to confirm and instead actively work to defeat the targeted nominee—either through a defeat on the floor
of the Senate or (equally as effective) by delaying a nominee so that the nominee never
receives a vote.
III.

THE METHODOLOGY OF EXAMINING A “CONTROVERSIAL” COURT OF APPEALS NOMINEE

To understand how interest group involvement set out in Part II operates in practice, this article presents a case study of the confirmation of Leslie H. Southwick to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. While it is impossible to generalize from the results, the
use of a single case study in this instance is a valid method to test a theoretical frame86
work. The nature of the Southwick confirmation provides an especially good study.
Southwick was first nominated to a district court position and passed through the Senate
Judiciary Committee with no opposition. It was only after he was subsequently nominated to the Fifth Circuit that his nomination triggered interest group involvement. Second,
Southwick’s nomination received a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee as
well as an ultimately successful floor vote, eliminating the problem faced by some controversial nominees who are delayed and never receive a vote by the full Senate. In addition, all sides agreed that Southwick was a well-qualified nominee, and that opposition to
his nomination was based on his perceived ideology. Utilizing the Southwick nomination,
this article seeks to answer three questions: (a) What frames were presented by the inter82

Scherer, supra note 42, at 1029. See also Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice:
Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499
(1998) (interest group influence had a distinct impact on Senator voting on the nominations of Bork,
Souter, and Thomas to the United States Supreme Court).
83
STEIGERWALT, supra note 22, at 105.
84
Id. at 106–109.
85
ENTMAN, supra note 74, at 12.
86
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE AND ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 109–24 (2005).
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est groups who became involved in the Southwick nomination?; (b) Did the senators who
spoke against the nomination adopt the interest group frames?; and finally, (c) What is the
impact of this change in the confirmation process?
Content analysis was used to determine the frames that interest groups used to oppose Southwick. Groups that opposed the Southwick nomination were identified through
the Congressional Record. Although these groups can no longer testify before the Judiciary Committee, they often submit letters laying out their opposition. Every sentence of
each letter of opposition submitted in the record was coded for the nature of the opposition, including the issues or concerns of each interest group.
After identifying the frames proposed by the interest groups, the next step was to
examine whether the senators adopted the frames. To make this determination, content
analysis was again performed, this time on statements made during the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Each statement made by a senator was evaluated to determine whether they
adopted the frames proposed by interest groups or whether they modified or even rejected
the frames.
IV.

SOUTHWICK THE NOMINEE: EVALUATING INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT

On May 3, 1979, President Jimmy Carter nominated Henry Politz to a newly creat87
ed seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On July 12, 1979,
Politz was confirmed by the Senate by a voice vote with no recorded opposition. Twenty
years later, on August 10, 1999, Judge Politz took senior status. 88 This provided incoming
President George W. Bush the opportunity to name his successor. Bush nominated
Charles W. Pickering on May 25, 2001. At the time of the nomination, Pickering was
89
serving as a federal district judge in Mississippi. Pickering’s circuit court nomination
received a “well qualified” rating from the American Bar Association (ABA), but was
immediately opposed by interest groups who accused him of being insensitive on civil
90
rights issues. The Pickering nomination stalled in the Democratic-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee, which voted three times not to move the nomination to the Senate
91
floor.
87

The seat was created by the Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 44(a)). .
88
See History of the Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1902&cid=999&ctype (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
89
Pickering was nominated to the district court by President George H.W. Bush in 1990 and unanimously confirmed. History of the Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1883&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na
90
Adam Liptak, Judge Appointed by Bush After Impasse in Senate Retires, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at A3.
91
CHARLES PICKERING, SUPREME CHAOS: THE POLITICS AND JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION & THE CULTURE WAR 9
(2005). President Bush went public to support the Pickering nomination in March 2002. Appearing at
a press conference with Mike Moore, the Democratic Attorney General for Mississippi, former Democratic Governor of Mississippi William Winter, and Frank W. Hunger, former Assistant Attorney General and brother-in-law of former Vice President Al Gore, President Bush said, “I nominated a very
good man from Mississippi named Charles Pickering to the appellate bench, and I expect him to be
confirmed by the United States Senate. I think the country is tired of people playing politics all the
time in Washington. And I believe they're holding this man's nomination up for political purposes. It's
not fair, and it's not right.” Remarks During a Meeting with Judge Charles W. Pickering, Sr., and an Exchange with Reporters, 2002 PUB. PAPERS 349 (March 6, 2002).
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The scene changed after the mid-term elections in 2002, when Republicans took
control of the Senate. Republican leaders claimed that the delay in confirming President
Bush’s nominees was a contributing factor to the Democrats losing control of the Senate.
President Bush specifically mentioned the delays while campaigning for Republican candidates and Senator Trent Lott’s (R-MS) press secretary said of the delays: “Clearly, it did
not help the Democrats’ chances of92either retaining control or gaining control of the Senate . . . . It backfired completely.” Lott himself, the new majority leader, made it clear
that confirming Pickering and other pending nominees would be a top priority: “[W]ith
the Senate in Republican hands, we will move decisively to confirm Judge Pickering,
who unfortunately was bottled up in Democratic
partisanship, and we will work on con93
firming other nominees as soon as possible.” The Pickering nomination was subsequently voted out of the Judiciary Committee, but stalled on the floor of the Senate, when
Democratic94 senators filibustered Pickering along with a number of other Bush judicial
nominees. President Bush subsequently appointed Pickering to the bench in 2004
through a recess appointment. Before the recess appointment came to an end (and before
the nomination went back to the Senate), Pickering asked the President to withdraw his
nomination. In discussing his withdrawal, Pickering blamed his defeat on “extreme special interest groups” who were opposed to “any nominee with strong religious convictions who personally disagrees with them on abortion, marriage and references to God at
public ceremonies and institutions. These far-left groups cowed Democrat leadership into
95
opposing my nomination.”
Bush then nominated Michael B. Wallace on February 8, 2006. Wallace, a lawyer in
private practice in Jackson, Mississippi, served as counsel to Trent Lott during the Clinton impeachment. Wallace received a “not qualified” rating from the ABA, 96 and encountered opposition from some of the same groups who opposed the Pickering nomination. 97
Wallace ultimately withdrew his name from consideration for the seat in December
2006,
98
after the Democrats retook control of the Senate in the 2006 mid-term elections. Interest
groups on both ends of the ideological spectrum were blamed for the withdrawal of the
Wallace nomination. Democrats, citing the nomination of Wallace (among others), argued
that the Bush administration “seems intent on heeding the marching orders of the narrow,

92

Audrey Hudson, GOP Set to End Judicial Backlog: Stalled Bush Nominees Face a More Welcoming
Senate, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2002, at A-1.
93
Id.
94
Steven G. Calabresi, Pirates We Be, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2003, at A-14. Calabresi notes that the use of
the filibuster on judicial nominees was an unprecedented move: “Now for the first time in 214 years
of American history a minority of senators is seeking to extend the tradition of filibustering from legislation to judicial nominees who they know enjoy support of a majority of the Senate. This is a
change of constitutional dimensions and amounts to a kind of coup d’état.”
95
Liptak, supra note 90.
96
Gina Holland, Bush Nominee Receives "Unqualified" Rating From Lawyers Group, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 11, 2006.
97
Editorial, Help Wanted: Qualified Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at A-18; Cragg Hines, W Taps Another Throwback for Important Appeals Seat, HOUSTON CHRON. Feb. 15, 2006, at B-11.
98
Judicial Nominee Rated Unqualified, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at A-1; Robin Fitzgerald, Wallace
Withdrawal Opens Space; Bush Can Now Select Another Nominee, THE SUN HERALD, Dec. 27, 2006, at A6.
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special interest groups on the right and picking fights.” 99 Republicans attacked the ABA
as a “liberal interest group” in giving Wallace an unqualified rating. 100 By the time Wallace withdrew, the Politz seat had been vacant for eight years and had been declared a
“judicial emergency” by the Federal Judicial Center.
On January 9, 2007, President Bush nominated his third choice for the seat, Leslie
H. Southwick. Southwick did not start as a controversial court of appeals nominee. Instead, Southwick began his confirmation path as an uncontroversial district court nominee. 101 Southwick had a distinguished career prior to the nomination. He graduated cum
laude from Rice University and then went on to the University of Texas Law School. After law school, he clerked for the Chief Judge on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
and then moved on to clerk for Judge Charles Clark on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
He then practiced law in Jackson, Mississippi; served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Division of the Department of Justice; and was elected to the Mississippi
Court of Appeals where he served for twelve years. 102 He also served as a Judge Advocate
General in Iraq with the Mississippi Army National Guard, authored a number of scholarly articles, and taught as a professor of law at Mississippi College School of Law. Southwick received a “Judicial Excellence” award from the Mississippi State Bar Association,
an award voted on by lawyers. In evaluating Southwick’s qualifications for the district
court position, the ABA rated Southwick “well qualified.”
With very little discussion and no debate, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported
Southwick’s district court nomination to the full Senate with a positive recommendation. 103 It is likely that Southwick would have easily been confirmed as a district court
judge if the nomination had been brought up for a vote. However, before the nomination
was acted on, the 2006 mid-term elections gave the Democrats a majority in the Senate.
With the Politz seat vacant, Bush withdrew Southwick’s district court nomination and
resubmitted his name to the Fifth Circuit seat. The White House, seeking to avoid a fight
after the Republican losses in the Senate, believed that Southwick would be an acceptable
99

Judicial Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Sept. 19, 2006) (statement
of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
100
Edward Whelan, Lowering the Bar: The Corrupt ABA Judicial Evaluation Process, WKLY. STAND., June
12, 2006.
101
152 CONG. REC. S5515 (daily ed. June 6, 2006).
102
History of the Federal Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3163&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na
(last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
103
Ana Radelat, Judicial Candidate Enjoys Easy Going in Senate Hearing, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Sept. 20,
2006 (stating that Southwick “enjoyed a quick and cordial confirmation hearing" and that he is "expected to breeze through confirmation”). The fact that Southwick faced no opposition as a district
court nominee but faced substantial opposition as a court of appeals nominee provides initial evidence of the importance of interest group opposition. The lack of opposition was likely strategic in
two ways. As discussed below, interest groups must make decisions about nominees to actively oppose. Interest groups may choose not to actively oppose a district court nominee because that judge’s
decisions are subject to review by an appellate court. Therefore, although not true for individual litigants, interest groups may perceive district court positions as less important or visible than court of
appeals positions. Second, evaluating and opposing nominees takes resources and the ability to get
the attention of Senators to support interest group opposition. Interest groups might well conclude
that there is not a strong enough likelihood of triggering opposition from sympathetic senators to
expend the resources necessary to oppose a court of appeals nominee.
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(non-controversial) nominee because of his background and his recent uneventful hearing
for the district court position. 104
The White House’s prediction proved incorrect. A number of interest groups came
out in opposition to the Southwick nomination. These groups included, among others,
Lambda Legal, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), Human Rights Campaign, and People for the
105
American Way. As discussed below, these groups focused their opposition primarily on
decisions that Southwick joined while a member of the Mississippi Court of Appeals. The
three most-cited opinions were S.B. v. L.W.; 106 Richmond v. Department of Health Services; 107 and Dubard v. Biloxi HMA. 108 Because a significant amount of group opposition
arose as a result of these cases, it is helpful to discuss these cases in some detail.
The first case, S.B. v. L.W., was a custody dispute regarding whether the mother,
who was bisexual, should be awarded custody of the child. 109 In Mississippi, the court
must consider several factors to determine what is in the best interest of the child before
awarding custody. 110 One of those factors is “moral fitness” of the parents. 111 The Mississippi Court of Appeals determined that the moral fitness factor (along with other factors
such as financial and economic stability) weighed in favor of the father and awarded cus112
tody to him. Southwick joined both the majority opinion as well as a separate concurring opinion. The concurrence stressed the public policy of the state regarding homosexuality, noting that the state legislature enacted laws: (a) prohibiting homosexuals from
104

R. Jeffrey Smith, 4 Nominees to Appeals Courts are Dropped; 32 Appointments Re-sent to Senate,
WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2007, at A-03 (noting that President Bush withdrew four controversial nominees
from consideration and that this “abrupt reversal” received praise from the liberal interest groups
People for the American Way and Alliance For Justice for seeking “bipartisan consensus”); 153 CONG.
REC. S13242 (Oct. 23, 2007) (statement of Sen. Thad Cochran) ([T]he rejection of Pickering and Wallace “made it clear that those judicial nominees were unacceptable. So [Senator Lott, Senator
Cochran, and President Bush] put our heads together, we talked about what the other options were,
and decided Leslie Southwick was the epitome of someone who had to be acceptable to the Senate.”).
105
A number of groups supported the Southwick nomination. Because this article is interested in the
framing of Southwick by groups opposing his nomination, the focus is only on those groups opposing
the nomination.
106
793 So. 2d 656 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
107
No. 96-CC-00667-COA, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 637 (Miss. Ct. App. August 4, 1998), rev'd, 745 So. 2d
254 (Miss. 1999).
108
No. 98-CA-01001-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 468 (Miss. Ct. App. July 20, 1999), rev'd 778 So. 2d
113 (Miss. 2000).
109
S.B., 793 So. 2d at 657 (noting that after the divorce, “the mother moved into a house with a woman. The mother testified that she was a bisexual and admitted that her relationship with the woman
was intimate”).
110
The factors, which are commonly referred to as the “Albright factors,” were first set out collectively
in Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983).
111
The remaining factors include: (a) age, health, and sex of child; (b) continuity of care prior to separation; (c) best parenting skills and willingness and capacity to provide primary care; (d) employment and responsibilities of employment; (e) physical and mental health and age of parents; (f) emotional ties of parent and child; (g) home, school, and community record of child; (h) preference of
child (if of sufficient age); (i) stability of the home environment and employment of parents; and (j)
other relevant factors. Albright, 437 So. 2d at 1005.
112
S.B., 793 So. 2d at 657.
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adopting; (b) prohibiting recognition of same-sex marriages that take place in other juris113
dictions; and (c) criminalizing sodomy. In addition to noting the legislation, the concurrence said:
I do recognize that any adult may choose any activity in which to engage;
however, I am also aware that such person is not thereby relieved of the
consequences of his or her choice. It is a basic tenet that an individual’s
exercise of freedom will not also provide an escape of the consequences
flowing from the free exercise of such a choice. As with the present situation, the mother may view her decision to participate in a homosexual relationship as an exertion of her perceived right to do so. However, her
choice is of significant consequence, . . . in that her rights to custody of her
114
child may be significantly impacted.
115

The second case, Richmond v. Mississippi Department of Human Services, involved the termination of Bonnie Richmond, an employee of the Mississippi Department
of Human Services. The facts were that “on May 23, 1994 while in conference with Joyce
Johnson . . . and Jerald Everett . . . [Richmond] referred to one of our black employees as
‘a good ole nigger’ and . . . that upon returning to DeSoto County [Richmond] approached this black employee and referred to her using exactly the same
words . . .
116
.” Richmond was subsequently fired for the comments and appealed the dismissal to
the Mississippi Employee Appeals Board. 117 The Board reversed the MDHS decision and
ordered Richmond reinstated, finding that the conduct was not sufficiently egregious to
118
justify termination. The Department then appealed the Board’s decision. The case was
assigned to the Mississippi Court of Appeals. 119
In an opinion that Southwick joined but did not write, the Mississippi Court of Ap120
peals upheld the Board’s decision to reinstate Richmond. The court’s majority stressed
the limited nature of its review, and held that the justification given for firing Richmond
was the disruption the statement caused within the department, but the court could find no
evidence in the record of a disruption. 121 The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed to consider the court of appeals decision and reversed. The supreme court held that “[u]nder the
particular circumstances of this case, Bonnie Richmond’s use of a racial slur on a single
113

Id. at 662 (Payne, J. concurring). This opinion was issued prior to the United States Supreme Court
decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which declared Texas’ law criminalizing sodomy
unconstitutional.
114
Id. at 663 (Payne, J. concurring).
115
Richmond v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 96-CC-00667-COA, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 637 (Miss.
Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1998).
116
Id. at *5-6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117
Id. at *1–2.
118
Id. at *1.
119
Under the Mississippi system, a case is originally appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, and
the court then assigns certain cases to the Mississippi Court of Appeals. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-4-3(1)
(West 2011) (“The Court of Appeals shall have the power to determine or otherwise dispose of any
appeal or other proceeding assigned to it by the Supreme Court.”).
120
Richmond, 1998 Miss. App. LEXIS 637, at *1.
121
Id. at *16–17.
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occasion does not rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment, and therefore
does not warrant dismissal of her from employment with DHS. However, we remand this
matter back to the Employee Appeals Board for the imposition of a lesser penalty, or to
122
make detailed findings on the record why no penalty should be imposed.”
The final case is Dubard v. Biloxi HMA. The Dubard case involved an employee
who sued a prospective employer for withdrawing a job offer after the employee failed a
drug test that was a condition of employment. 123 The Mississippi Court of Appeals, over a
dissent by Judge Southwick, determined that the employee presented enough facts regarding breach of an employment contract or the possible right to equitable relief that it
was inappropriate to dismiss the case on summary judgment. 124 Southwick’s dissent argued that Mississippi is an employment-at-will state and that Dubard’s claim would fail
for that reason: “I find that employment at will, for whatever flaws a specific application
may cause, is not only the law of Mississippi but it provides the best balance of the competing interests in the normal employment situation.” 125 After the court of appeals’ decision, the employer sought review by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Court agreed to
hear the case, reversed the court of appeals and (adopting the position taken by South126
wick in dissent), dismissed the employee’s claim.
These cases provide context as to how various interest groups framed their opposition to Southwick. Importantly, the cases were not utilized to discuss legal process (e.g.,
the proper standard of review for agency decisions). Instead, each of these cases were
cited for a broader principle or frame. For example, S.B. was presented to demonstrate
opposition to gay rights, Richmond was presented as evidence of Southwick’s insensitivity to civil rights, and Dubard was cited as proof that Southwick favored business interests
over employees. To demonstrate this use of case-as-frame, Figure 2 provides a breakdown of the nature of the opposition to Southwick by national interest groups.

122

Richmond v. Miss. Dep't of Human Serv., 745 So. 2d 254, 258 (Miss. 1999).
Dubard v. Biloxi H.M.A., No. 1998-CA-01001-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 468, at *2-5 (Miss. Ct. App.
Jul. 20, 1999).
124
Id. at *11.
125
Id. at *16 (Southwick, P.J., dissenting).
126
Dubard v. Biloxi H.M.A., 778 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 2000).
123
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Figure 2. Issues Identified by Interest Groups
(percentage of sentences discussing)
Gay Rights
(S.B. v.
L.W.)

Civil Rights
(Richmond v.
Dept of Health
Services)

Pro-Business;
Ruling in
Favor of
Employers
(Dubard v.
HMA)

Lack of
Diversity
on Bench

Ruling Against
Personal Injury
Plaintiffs

National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force

71.4%

--

--

--

--

28.6%

NAACP (national chapter)

--

47.8%

--

26.1%

--

26.1%

People for the American Way

26%

33.8%

12%

1.4%

--

26.8%

Human Rights
Campaign

92.6%

--

--

--

--

7.4%

Community Rights
128
Counsel et al

--

--

--

--

84.2%

15.8%

--

20%

50%

--

--

20%

9.1%

54.5%

--

9.1%

--

27.3%

--

48%

36%

--

--

16%

15.6%

71.9%

9.4%

--

--

15.6%

Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights

13.8%

55.2%

17.2%

--

--

13.8

National Organization for
Women

--

12.5%

12.5%

--

--

75%

Jewish Alliance for Law and
Social Action

16.7%

33.3%

--

--

--

50%

Legal Momentum

33.3%

38.9%

--

--

5.6%

22.2%

International Union

129

National Council of
Jewish Women
National Employment
Lawyers Association
National Partnership for
Women & Families
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This column includes other either miscellaneous or neutral statements. For
example, a number of letters include, as the first few sentences, introductory or
background information about theirganizations, which are coded as “other” (even
if they note that the organization opposes the nomination). In addition, some
groups commented that the record was incomplete, citing to the need for unpublished records. These statements were also included in this column.
128
This letter was filed jointly by the Community Rights Counsel; Earthjustice;
Friends of the Earth; Sierra Club; Endangered Habitats League; Louisiana
Bayoukeeper, Inc.; Louisiana Environmental Action Network; San Francisco
Baykeeper; Texas Campaign for the Environment; and Valley Watch, Inc.
129
This letter was filed jointly by the International Union and United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America.

Other
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These frames are consistent with the first level of the cascading activation model of
framing. Interest groups attempted to trigger specific ideological cognitive schema and
associate them with Southwick. Frames adopted against Southwick—especially race and
sexual identity—have particularly strong cultural resonance. Also, note that interest
groups tended to reiterate the same opposition frames, thereby increasing the magnitude
of the frames. Based on interest group frames, if confirmed, Southwick’s decisions could
be expected: (a) with regard to civil rights, to oppose civil rights plaintiffs; (b) with regard to employer/employee relations, to oppose the employee; (c) in civil litigation, to
favor the defendant over the plaintiff; and (d) in criminal prosecutions, to favor the government over the criminal defendant.
It should be noted that the Southwick nomination provided a unique, nonideological opposition. Groups, such as the NAACP, cited the lack of diversity on the
Fifth Circuit as a reason for opposing Southwick. Derrick Johnson, President of the Mississippi Chapter of the NAACP, set out this line of opposition:
[T]he Southwick nomination does nothing to ameliorate the egregious
problem with the lack of diversity on Mississippi’s federal bench. Mississippi has the highest African-American population of any state (36%). Yet
there has never been an African-American appointed to represent Mississippi on the Fifth Circuit . . . President Bush has made ten nominations to
the federal bench in Mississippi—district and appellate. None were African American. This is extremely disturbing to many Mississippians, who
believe the State should be fairly represented on the federal bench. 130
While this presents a frame based on race, it is not directed explicitly at Southwick’s perceived ideology or decision–making.
As discussed in Part II (D), merely framing a nominee is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for interest group success. If the frames are not sufficiently culturally
congruent or they lack sufficient magnitude, the frame will fail to modify senators’ presumption-of-confirmation behavior. For frames to be effective, they must move the opposed nominee (Southwick) onto the senator’s agenda, and must prompt senators to adopt
the group’s preferred frame. To determine the success of interest groups in agenda setting
and framing in the Southwick context, the next step is to evaluate what occurred in the
senators’ expressed opposition to the nomination.
The hearing on the Southwick nomination was held on May 10, 2007, before the
Senate Judiciary Committee. 131 The hearing was chaired by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse
(D-RI). Other members of the Judiciary Committee who were present included Edward
Kennedy (D-Mass), Russell Feingold (D-Wis), Richard Durbin (D-Ill), Orrin Hatch (RUtah), Sam Brownback (R-Kan), and Tom Coburn (R-Okl). Chair of the Committee, Patrick Leahy (D-Vt), was not present at the hearing but submitted comments for the record.
The hearings began with Southwick’s introduction and statements of support from both

130

153 CONG. REC. S13245 (Oct. 23, 3007) (Letter from Derrick Johnson to Sens. Patrick Leahy and
Arlen Specter).
131
Nominations of Leslie Southwick, to Be Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit; Janet T. Neff, to be District
Judge for the Western District of Michigan; and Liam O'Grady, to be District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007).
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Mississippi senators, Thad Cochran and Trent Lott. 132 They both stressed Southwick’s
qualifications and background and encouraged a quick confirmation.
After a short introductory statement by Southwick, Senator Whitehouse began the
questioning. He first asked a question about Southwick’s position on the separation of
powers and the court’s role in it. After a short answer (“I believe separation of powers [is]
vital. It’s part of how this country is structured, how this country’s government has been
organized.”), 133 Whitehouse then asked about the S.B. v. L.W. decision: “There has been
some controversy about a decision that you did not author, but signed onto, both in the
main opinion and the concurring opinion, S.B. v. L.W. that involved a woman who was
gay and who was seeking custody of her daughter. Because that has been a matter of
some controversy, I looked at the decision myself.” 134 He questioned the use of the phrase
“homosexual lifestyle” in the opinion—noting that it was derogatory—and stated that a
gay person coming before a judge who had joined in an opinion using that term may feel
that they could not get a fair hearing. 135 Southwick responded that he joined the concurring opinion in the case because he felt it emphasized the legislative position at that time
on gay rights issues. He also noted that some of the analysis would be different now, after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas. Southwick sought to assure the Senator that all who appeared before his court would receive a fair hearing and be treated with
respect. 136
The next Democratic senator to question Southwick was Senator Feingold.
Feingold began his questioning with the Richmond case and the statement in the opinion
that the decision to fire the employee was “not motivated by racial hatred or animosity.” 137
Southwick responded: “To me, that case was about the review standard and the deference
138
that is given to administrative agencies. It was a tough case.” Senator Feingold then
moved to S.B. The Senator and nominee had the following exchange that provides some
insight into the type of questions that were raised regarding the case:
Senator Feingold: Do you believe that one of the consequences of having
a same-sex relationship should be to risk losing custody of your own
child?
Southwick: I think, if the law I’m supposed to apply says that, then my
hands are tied. If you’re talking to me generally as a policy matter, I don’t
think that’s my realm. But I will say . . . the legal landscape in 2001 was
Bowers v. Hardwick, which says there was no privacy interest, liberty interest in even private homosexual relations. In 2003, there became such a
recognized right and that changes the analysis, at least, and may well
change the outcome.
***

132

Id. at 3–5 (statements of Sens. Thad Cochran and Trent Lott).
Id. at 45 (statement of Leslie Southwick).
134
Id. (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse).
135
Id. at 46 (statement of Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse).
136
Id. at 46–47 (statement of Leslie Southwick).
137
Id. at 51–52 (statement of Sen. Feingold).
138
Id. at 52 (statement of Leslie Southwick).
133
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Senator Feingold: Do you believe that gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgendered Americans are entitled to equal protection of the laws?
Southwick: Well, I think everyone is entitled to be treated fairly. If you
are talking about, as a fundamental right, I think the law is evolving as to
where the fundamental rights regarding gay relationship exist. And I will
apply the law rationally, reasonably, and the fairest reasoning and reading
that I can make of the precedents that control. 139
At the end of this exchange, Feingold asked Southwick if he would disassociate himself
from either the Richmond or S.B. opinions. Southwick responded: “Stand by them. I believe the Richmond opinion was correct. I didn’t write it. I joined the concurrence . . . . If
you say I’m endorsing everything in an opinion that I did not write every word, every
phrase, I do not.” 140
After Feingold, Senator Kennedy questioned Southwick about the Richmond case
as well, and whether Southwick would write a separate opinion in the case if he could go
back. Southwick replied that he applied the law as he interpreted it and that he would not
change his approach to the case. 141
Senator Durbin followed Kennedy. His questioning was wide ranging—beginning
with questions regarding the Federalist Society and whether Southwick could “point to an
example . . . where you really stepped out and subjected yourself to criticism for taking
an unpopular view on behalf of the dispossessed.” 142 He also addressed the lack of minority representation on the Fifth Circuit:
It is my understanding that President Bush has submitted 10 nominees for
the Federal bench in Mississippi, 7 at the District level, 3 at the Fifth Circuit, and not one has been African American. Mississippi being a state
with more than a third of the population African-American, you can understand why the African-American population feels that this is a recurring
pattern which does not indicate an effort to find balance on the court when
it comes to racial composition, or even to give African-Americans a
chance in this situation. But having said that, I believe you have the right
143
to be judged on your own merits in terms of your own nomination . . . .
Durbin then asked about the Richmond case explicitly and queried whether Southwick
could understand why some would consider the decision a sign of insensitivity. Southwick responded that he could understand the aversion to the use of the word and that
“there is no worst word.” 144
The Republicans on the Committee spoke in favor of Southwick. It would be expected that these senators would seek to either negate the frames raised by Democratic
senators or attempt to reframe the debate surrounding the nomination. That is exactly

139

Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 54 (statement of Leslie Southwick).
141
Id. at 55–56 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
142
Id. at 59 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
143
Id. at 57–58 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin).
144
Id. at 60 (statement of Leslie Southwick).
140
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what happened. Senator Hatch, attempting to shift the frame from ideological issues to
competence, stressed Southwick’s “well qualified” rating by the ABA:
The ABA says that [well qualified] means that you have qualities such as,
and I’m quoting here from their published criteria, “compassion, openmindedness, freedom from bias, and commitment to equal justice under
law.” Now, no one has ever, to my knowledge, accused the ABA of having
a conservative bias. So when the most exhaustive evaluation of your record shows that you are open-minded, free from bias, and committed to
equal justice, I am baffled by some of the more far-left groups who look at
just a few cases and consider only the result of those few cases, and then
pronounce that you are controversial and your record is troubling, or that
145
you favor certain interests over others.
Senator Hatch also attempted to shift the frame from that of a nominee constantly opposing a particular ideological viewpoint, to frame Southwick as a nominee who had been
involved in approximately 7000 opinions while serving on the Mississippi Court of Appeals and who had separately authored between 800 and 850 opinions, with interest
groups picking very few of those to inappropriately characterize how Southwick would
decide cases. 146
This overview of Southwick’s hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee provides empirical support for the model set out in Part II. Every Democratic senator who
spoke overwhelmingly adopted the arguments and concerns of interest groups in their
questioning. The hearing demonstrated that with regard to the Southwick nomination, not
only did interest groups sound the “fire alarm” with regard to the nomination, but they
also successfully framed and activated opposition to the nomination.
After the Judiciary Committee hearing, there was no certainty that the nomination
would be successfully voted out of Committee to the floor of the Senate. In fact, the
Committee vote occurred on August 2, 2007—more than three months after the hearing
and seven months after Southwick’s nomination. Interest groups opposing the confirmation moved their opposition to the media. This is consistent with the cascading activation
model. Media coverage reinforces the interest group’s preferred frames and, because the
media provides additional voices to the fray, it also increases the frame’s magnitude.
The New York Times published an editorial opposing the nomination on June 5,
2007, quoting the position of the Mississippi Magnolia Bar Association (an organization
of African-American Mississippi lawyers): “‘We question whether Judge Southwick will
properly enforce the law when it comes to the rights of those who are unpopular and who
are marginalized by the political process.’” 147 The editorial then discussed the Richmond
case and claimed that the opinion demonstrated a “thorough lack of understanding of the
odious impact of such language.” Chiding Southwick for joining the S.B. concurrence,
the editorial goes on to say: “[I]t would be hard for a black person with a discrimination
case, or a gay person with a family law issue, to have any confidence that Judge Southwick would treat them fairly . . . . Judge Southwick’s judicial record also shows the usual
145

Id. at 47–48 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
Id. at 47 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
147
Editorial, An Unacceptable Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at A-1.
146
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pattern of President Bush’s judicial nominees: insensitivity toward workers, consumers
and people injured by corporations.” 148 The Washington Post also ran an article on June
10, 2007, opposing the Southwick nomination—relying explicitly on information provided by groups such as the Alliance for Justice and People for the American Way to question Southwick’s “problematic record on civil rights that strongly suggested he may lack
the commitment to social justice progress.” 149
The August 7 vote in the Judiciary Committee was tense and uncertain, a far cry
from the consensus decision that occurs without such opposition. In fact, when asked the
day before the hearing whether the Southwick nomination would be voted out of the Judiciary Committee, Chair of the Committee Patrick Leahy said: “I have no idea.” 150
Southwick was ultimately voted out of the Committee by a vote of 10–9—with Senator
Diane Feinstein (D-Cal) breaking with her Democratic colleagues to cast the deciding
vote in favor of Southwick. Before casting her vote, Senator Feinstein read a prepared
statement. She said that she had lengthy conversations with Southwick and received a
written response to the Richmond decision. She concluded: “What emerged was an appreciation on my part that Judge Southwick is a qualified, circumspect person . . . . I
don’t believe he’s a racist. I don’t believe I’m a racist. I believe he made a mistake.” 151
She also said that her decision was based on the fact that the decisions in question were
not written by Southwick. 152 Finally, she noted that the ABA had given Southwick its
highest rating, and that the seat was determined to be a “judicial emergency” by the Fed153
eral Judicial Conference.
Feinstein’s Judiciary Committee vote brought instant condemnation from interest
groups that had opposed the Southwick nomination. Nan Aron, president of Alliance for
Justice, said: “[The vote on Southwick] was a test of whether Democrats were up to the
task of applying scrutiny to Bush’s judicial nominees.” 154 Becky Dansky of the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force said that gay and lesbian Californians “are not going to be
155
silent about [the Feinstein vote].” A letter to the editor in the San Francisco Chronicle,
citing the position of the Human Rights Campaign, says Feinstein “again showed her true
colors when she broke from her party . . . and cast the tie-breaking vote in favor of the
nomination of Leslie Southwick . . . .” 156 As discussed in Part II (C), senators run a potential electoral risk when they ignore the positions of interest groups. These statements provide direct evidence of why senators are susceptible to the frames of interest groups that
can motivate the senator’s base. Failure to adhere to the frames can, at a minimum, result
in bad press and, at the worst, compromise possible reelection.
After the vote in the Judiciary Committee, the nomination moved to the full Senate,
and was placed on the calendar for October 24, 2007. On the floor it faced two significant
veto points. The first was the possibility of a filibuster. In order to end debate on the nom148
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Robert Barnes & Michael Abramowitz, Conservatives Worry About Court Vacancies, WASH. POST, June
10, 2007, at A4.
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153 CONG. REC. S13249-51 (Oct. 23, 2007).
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ination, a motion was brought to the floor to end cloture. Debate on the cloture motion
takes up twenty-seven pages of the Congressional Record. The debate centered on the
same arguments and cases that were examined in the Judiciary Committee hearings. For
example, every senator who spoke against the nomination cited or referenced the Richmond case. In addition, seventy-one percent (five out of seven) of senators mentioned the
S.B. v. L.W. case. Only one senator mentioned the Dubard case in expressing opposition.
Importantly, while the same frames were utilized in the debate, how these frames
were utilized varied. Recall that the cascading activation model predicts that as the
frames flow/cascade down from interest groups to the public/media, to the senators, how
the frame is perceived and used will become more blunted and less nuanced. In the confirmation context, another layer can be added to the levels of the cascade—whether the
senator is a member of the Judiciary Committee.
Members of the Judiciary Committee tended to demonstrate a more nuanced understanding of the cases and arguments utilized against the nomination. On the other hand,
senators who were not members of the Committee tended to utilize more absolute statements. For example, Senator Boxer stated (after referencing the facts of the Richmond
and S.B. cases but never mentioning them by name): “I am deeply disappointed that President Bush has once again attempted to fill the Fifth Circuit
vacancy with a nominee
157
holding views far to the right of most Americans . . . .” Senator Menendez stated that
he opposed Southwick because of his “long and consistent history of insensitivity
toward
158
discrimination and of siding with the powerful against the powerless . . . .” He went on
to say: “He will be the type of judge who consistently rules in favor of big business and
corporate interests at the expense of workers’ rights and consumer rights . . . . What I do
know is that he interprets the law in a way that is not blind to color, blind to race, in fact,
focuses on these factors and sides against them.” 159 Senator Reid stated: “As a member of
the Mississippi State appellate court, Judge Southwick joined decisions that demonstrate
160
insensitivity to, and disinterest in, the cause of civil rights.” Finally, Senator Clinton
stated: “His tenure as a judge on the Mississippi Court of Appeals reveals a record that
fails to honor the principles of equality and justice and demonstrates a disregard for civil
rights.” 161
The point here is not that this type of blunt opposition is insincere, but that it is the
result of information received from and filtered through interest groups. It is satisficing
by these senators and results in a particular view of a nominee that is shaped strongly by
interest group frames. On the other hand, members of the Judiciary Committee, while still
adopting interest group frames, have the opportunity to explore nuance with the nominee,
which tends to be reflected in debates.
When the vote was taken on the cloture motion, it passed by a margin of 62 to 35,
with twelve Democrats voting in favor of ending debate. 162 After the vote on the cloture
motion, the next step was to vote on the nomination itself (another potential veto point).
Southwick was ultimately confirmed by a vote of 59 to 38. 163
157

153 CONG. REC. S13242 (Oct. 23, 2007).
153 CONG. REC. S13274 (Oct. 24, 2007).
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Id.
160
153 CONG. REC. S13299 (Oct. 24, 2007).
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153 CONG. REC. S13300 (Oct. 24, 2007).
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Id.
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In sum, the influence of interest groups on the trajectory of the confirmation of
Southwick is undeniable. The uncontroversial district court nominee became a highly
controversial court of appeals nominee, because interest groups became involved in the
process. Not only did the interest groups delay the confirmation, but their frames also
dictated the terms of the debate. These frames were particularly strong for those senators
who were not members of the Judiciary Committee.
V.

EVALUATING INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS

The confirmation battle over the nomination of Leslie Southwick provides a
glimpse into the current confirmation process for court of appeals judges. This article
confirms the increasingly important role interest groups play. These groups determine
which nominees will be deemed controversial and shape the debate surrounding these
nominees by selecting the frames through which opposed nominees will be evaluated.
The case study has a larger importance as well. The study exposes trends that will
continue to impact the confirmation process for the foreseeable future. It is important to
note that these trends are institutional and not partisan. As such, the influence of interest
groups on the confirmation process will hold regardless of the party holding the Senate
164
majority.
The most important impact of interest group involvement is at the level of individual senators. Consider the Senate of the 1950s versus the Senate of today. The historic
Senate was an “encapsulated men’s club” in which norms, such as senatorial courtesy and
apprenticeship, were respected and followed. 165 As one scholar succinctly put it, in the
Senate of the 1950s, “the unwritten but well-understood rules of conduct virtually guaranteed that such potentially polarizing issues as the appointment of judges would not be
permitted to disrupt the orderly flow of Senate business.” 166 Senators were willing to
abide by the Senate “folkway” of senatorial courtesy and forego individual institutional
rights because they collectively believed that individual members would be better off
abiding by the norms. 167
Recall that the senatorial courtesy norm calls for non-home-state senators to defer
to the opinion of a home-state senator regarding a judicial nominee. Such deference is
exercised with the expectation that senators will respect the non-home-state senator’s
164

See Editorial, Breaking Faith: A Politically Driven Filibuster of a Sound Judicial Nominee, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2011, at A22 (discussing Republican filibuster of President Obama’s nomination of Goodwin
Liu to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
165
BARBARA SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. SENATE 1 (1989) (quoting Nelson W. Polsby,
Transformation of the American Political System 1950-1980, paper delivered to the annual meeting of
the American Political Science Association (1981)).
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SILVERSTEIN, supra note 28, at 132.
167
Donald R. Matthews, The Folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to Group Norms and Legislative Effectiveness, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1064, 1064 (1959) (defining Senate “folkways” as “unwritten but generally accepted and informally enforced norms of conduct in the chamber”). See also
SINCLAIR, supra note 165, at 21. Sinclair equates the decision by individual senators to forego their
institutional powers and abide by norms as fitting into a prisoner’s dilemma game theoretic model:
“Conformity involved some cost to the individual, but by and large, if everyone conformed, everyone
was better off. Widespread conformity with the norms provided direct benefits to senators in terms
of their individual goals. The norms may also have contributed to the institution’s ability to perform
its functions, but in no case did mutual cooperation have only an institutional payoff.”
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choice of nominee when a vacancy occurs in that senator’s state. This norm continued as
long as the cost of conforming to the norm was less than the cost of not conforming. 168
With the introduction of interest groups into the process, the calculus changed. Now the
costs that interest groups can impose are perceived to be greater than the benefit received
from adhering to the senatorial courtesy norm. As a result, the norm gives way, and senators begin to exercise their individual institutional powers. It is thus not surprising that
senators have been willing to delay and filibuster judicial nominees that would historically have gone through unopposed with the support of home-state senators (e.g., Southwick).
Senators recognize the implications of rejecting senatorial courtesy. In the Southwick debate, Senator Hatch noted the “tradition” of respecting the opinion of the homestate senators and urged senators not to “veer from that path.” 169 Senator Lott noted the
reasons for adhering to the norm: “Home State Senators are uniquely positioned to know
the personalities, qualifications, and reputations of the nominees from their state. The fact
that this traditional courtesy is being ignored should be cause for concern for every Senator in this Chamber.” 170
This is not to say that the loss of the norm of senatorial courtesy is a negative development. Opening the judicial confirmation process to debate is certainly more democratic than a nominee being selected in an efficient, closed system in which patronage is
the primary consideration. 171 Outside involvement can expose legitimate concerns about a
nominee that might not otherwise be brought to light. 172 In addition, with the increasing
importance of the federal courts in interpreting and determining issues of public policy, a
more vigorous debate over individual nominees can and should be expected. 173 As one
scholar noted: “[I]t is practically impossible to distinguish between judicial contributions
to the governmental process and legislative contributions. It is accordingly perfectly logical to demand that judicial personnel be subjected to the same test of fitness as legislative
personnel.” 174
The problem, however, as demonstrated by the Southwick case, is twofold. First,
the involvement of interest groups may not lead to more substantive debate. Instead, es168

SINCLAIR, supra note 165, at 22.
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pecially for senators who are not members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the debate
consists largely of un-nuanced characterizations of a nominee’s positions that mimic interest group frames. Second, the individualistic nature of the Senate provides individual
senators numerous opportunities to delay (and possibly defeat) a nominee who would
otherwise have majority support in the Senate if granted a vote, raising concerns about
the undemocratic nature of the process.
So what does the changing nature of the process portend for the future of confirmations? It means that regardless of the fact that both Democratic and Republican senators
give lip service to the need to change the politicized nature of the system, nothing will
change as long as satisfying interest groups provides a greater electoral benefit than not
opposing or delaying a nominee. 175 If the process is to be modified—to alleviate delay or
to change the nature of the debate—the Senate as a whole must act to alter the rules of
how nominees to lower federal courts are handled. 176 This will require adopting a process
that respects the power of individual senators and at the same time modifies the process
to limit the current number of veto points. In other words, the process should be structured so that the Senate acts through a structured evaluative process as opposed to a politicized free-for-all process. For example, the Senate could impose enforceable time limits
for a nominee to receive a hearing and vote in the Judiciary Committee. It could do the
same once a nominee reaches the floor of the Senate. A final possibility is the so-called
“nuclear option,” which would end the ability of senators to filibuster judicial nominees
who reach the floor of the Senate. None of these changes impacts the ability of a senator
to inquire into a nominee’s position on issues or to oppose a nominee based on political
or personal grounds. However, changes such as this would provide procedural certainty to
the process and ultimately ensure an up-or-down vote on the nominee.
The fact that members believe they obtain more benefits from exercising their individual power as a senator than in achieving consensus, means that agreements such as
that reached by the “Gang of 14” during the George W. Bush administration will not and
cannot hold. The “Gang of 14” arose when Democrats filibustered certain President Bush
nominees based on their perceived conservative ideology, and fourteen senators (seven
from each party) broke the filibuster and agreed in the future to only filibuster judicial
177
nominees under “extraordinary circumstances.” Because interest group pressure will
trump such informal agreements in the current political environment, they are doomed to
fail. The only way that agreements to determine the substantive qualifications of a nominee will be successful is if an objective (and likely largely administrative) method for
determining what is meant by a “qualified” nominee, and a method of enforcing the
175

Senator Jon Kyl recognized this fact in discussing the Southwick nomination: “I suggest today’s
vote is a watershed. If Senate Democrats decide to filibuster Judge Southwick today, a clearly qualified
nominee, they should not be surprised if they see similar treatment for Democratic nominees. This
cannot be a one-sided standard. So this isn’t just a vote about Judge Southwick; it is about the future
of the judicial nomination process. If Leslie Southwick cannot get an up-or-down vote, then I suspect
no Senator should expect a future Democratic or Republican president to be able to count on their
nominees not to be treated in the same fashion. Any little bit of controversy could be created to create
the kind of hurdles Judge Southwick is facing today.” 153 CONG. REC. S13280 (Oct. 24, 2007).
176
This recommendation does not include consideration of Supreme Court Justices. Because of the
rare and visible nature of the debate over these positions, such institutional changes are largely unnecessary.
177
Republican senators had threatened to eliminate the filibuster for judicial nominees—what Senator Trent Lott called the “nuclear option.”
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agreement against recalcitrant senators, is adopted. These types of evidence-limiting rules
are very unlikely because they would significantly limit the power of an individual senator. Unsurprisingly, the “Gang of 14” agreement has not held in the Obama Administration. 178
If institutional rules are not put in place with regard to judicial nominees, it is very
likely that the confirmation process will devolve into tit-for-tat political fights over nominations which harm both the Senate and the federal courts. This is precisely what appears
to be happening. When questions arise about delay in confirmation of judicial nominees,
the common response is to focus on how nominees were treated under prior administrations. 179 There is an inevitable race to the bottom aspect to this approach, where each successive change in administration justifies acting on fewer nominees because of the actions of prior administrations. If interest group involvement continues to increase and
senators are pressured to oppose more nominees, the problem will be exacerbated. In addition, with the increasing homogeneity and partisanship of both parties, there is a decreasing number of “partisan non-conformists” or those “moderate and cross-pressured
members . . . who have policy preferences outside the ideological mainstream of their
party.” 180 This means that not only will “Gang of 14”-type agreements not hold, they are
less likely to arise in the future because of the decreasing moderates in both parties.
Such battles have substantive negative impacts on the judiciary. The obvious implication of delayed and defeated nominees is a reduction in the number of judges sitting on
a court to hear and decide cases. This can increase the time it takes to have a case resolved, impacting both those parties litigating before federal courts as well as the judges
(and staff members) operating under increased workloads. 181 Indirectly, the nature of the
process can also impact the individuals who are willing to be considered for a judicial
position. The most qualified candidates may be hesitant to accept a nomination, knowing
how contentious the process has become. In fact, Justice Scalia has been outspoken in his
belief that the current confirmation process has negatively impacted the makeup of the
courts of appeal. 182 Because of the increasing caseload in the federal courts and the fact
that federal judges serve for life, the consequences of a highly politicized and uncertain
confirmation process can have a long-term impact on the federal courts.
178
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CONCLUSION

Trent Lott, who spoke about the impact of interest groups after the Southwick
confirmation debate, commented that “America didn’t elect advocacy groups to anything.” 183 The findings of this article indicate that while this may be true, interest groups
have recently assumed a significant role in the confirmation process. These groups determine which court of appeals nominees will see opposition, and propose frames that
senators adopt in debating a nominee. Their influence shifts the incentive calculus inside
the Senate, causing senators to abandon the norm of senatorial courtesy for a more partisan process.
If the current confirmation process was born of the increase in interest group involvement and the shifting of senators’ preferences, what can be done to prompt change?
The answer is that change must come from within the Senate itself. Because the current
preference structure will lead senators to exercise their institutional powers of delay in an
attempt to defeat a nominee, the only certain method to change this process is to adopt
rules and procedures that limit senators’ power to obstruct nominees. The current system
will inevitably lead to more partisan battles over nominees, which will ultimately have an
impact not only on a growing Senate stalemate over confirmation of federal judges, but
also on an understaffed court whose integrity has been compromised by bruising partisan
confirmation fights. As Senator Hatch aptly put it while discussing the confirmation of
Supreme Court justices: “political involvement in the selection of judges is a two-edged
sword whose backswing has the potential to injure the prestige and independence of the
Court as much as or more than its thrusts have the chance to reshape jurisprudential directions.” 184 In other words, while confirmation-as-political-battle may be to the short- term
advantage of senators, the long-term damage to the institutional integrity of the judiciary
could be the unintended yet alarming consequence.
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